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CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM

Campaign
Finance Reform,
Free Speech
and the
Supreme Court
by Derek Langhauser

In December 2003, the United States Supreme Court
upheld all the key provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign
Finance Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002. In their 5-4 decision, the justices deferred broadly to the limitations set by
Congress on unregulated “soft money” and “issue ads” in
political campaigns. Derek Langhauser, who worked in
Senator Olympia Snow’s office as counsel in McConnell
v FEC, as this case was called, gives a legal history of
the challenge of balancing Congress’ interest in protecting
the integrity of elections with the Constitution’s competitive rights of free speech and association. He describes in
detail the Supreme Court’s decision, the implications of
the decision, and the role of the Court in representative
democracy.
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CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM

The challenge…
The best test of truth is the power of thought to
get accepted into the marketplace of ideas.
Supreme Court Justice
1
Oliver W. Holmes, 1919
If the wealthy have more access to the most potent
media of communication in the marketplace of
ideas, is the trade really free and, if not, is the
end product really the truth?
Harvard Law Professor
2
Laurence H. Tribe, 1988
INTRODUCTION

oday, Justice Holmes and Professor Tribe would
have quite a debate about the United States
Supreme Court’s recent campaign finance decision
in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission. There,
the Court upheld all of the key provisions of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (or BCRA,
3
pronounced “bik-ra”). In doing so, the Court
deferred broadly to the congressional judgment that
the primary source of funding in today’s political
campaigns—unregulated or “soft” money—and the
primary means of influencing public opinion—socalled “issue ads” run by labor unions and corporations—should be subject to meaningful limitations
and disclosure requirements.
The Court upheld this new law by rejecting
almost out of hand a variety of challenges that
those provisions violated the speech and associational
rights of political activists of all stripes. Indeed,
one is hard-pressed to recall or anticipate another
instance where the Democratic, Republican and
Libertarian parties, let alone the National Rifle
Association and the American Civil Liberties Union,
all found themselves on the same—albeit losing—
side of an issue. This article explains how that came
to be by outlining the history of related campaign
finance laws and BCRA. The article then provides an
insider’s view of the litigation, and concludes with
observations on the Supreme Court’s role in judging
how we access our representative democracy.

T

FROM ROOT TO WATERGATE AND BUCKLEY

has always been to

balance the police
t has long been recognized
that unregulated political
power of Congress
campaigns can divest the electorate of its power to make
to protect the
reasoned choices. Indeed,
United States Secretary of
integrity of elections
State Elihu Root observed as
long ago as 1894 that “massive
with the Constitution’s
donations to political parties
and candidates have done
competitive rights
more to shake the confidence
of the plain people of small
of individual speech
means…than any other practice
… since the foundation of our
4
and association.
government.” Yet it also has
been long recognized that
undue regulation of political
campaigns can be used to perpetuate the rule of
a sitting government. Witness the observation by a
dissenting Justice in McConnell that “the first instinct
of power is the retention of power, and, under a
Constitution that requires periodic elections, that is best
achieved by the suppression of election-time speech.”
The challenge, therefore, has always been to
balance the police power of Congress to protect
the integrity of elections with the Constitution’s
competitive rights of individual speech and association.
In striking this balance, the courts have essentially
said that any such laws must be “closely drawn” or
“narrowly tailored” to address the specific problem
to diminish any undue intrusion on First Amendment
rights. But how close or narrow need such laws be?
On the one side of the continuum, there are disclosure
laws. These intrude minimally onto speech and associational rights, but they are clearly not sufficient to stem
more pervasive problems. On the other side, there are
bribery laws that effectively regulate blatant quid pro
quo exchanges. But as the McConnell majority recognized, “classic quid pro quo corruption… occurs only
occasionally,” and the “danger that officeholders will
decide issues not on their merits or the desires of their
constituencies, but according to the wishes of those
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who have made large financial contributions… is
neither easily detected nor practical to criminalize.”
Congress took its first major step to enact targeted
regulation when, in 1935, it focused on the unique
aggregations of wealth presented by corporations and
labor unions. Concerned with the potential undue
influence that such wealth can have on political
campaigns, Congress prohibited corporations and
labor unions from using their general treasury funds
to influence federal elections. These laws did not,
however, prohibit corporations and labor unions from
using non-treasury funds—such as those monies raised
by a political action committee—on federal elections.

By 1996, prominent members of Congress
on both sides of the aisle believed that
the exponential growth of soft money
and issue ads was… the reason for the
perception that elected officials were
corrupted by special interests.
The next significant step was the Federal Election
5
Campaign Act or FECA (pronounced “fe-ka”). Enacted
in 1971 and amended in 1974 in response to the
widespread election abuses of Watergate, FECA limited
the amount that individuals, groups and candidates
could contribute, and the total amounts that certain
entities could spend, in certain elections. Significantly,
FECA’s source and amount limitations did not apply
to contributions to national or state political parties
and their committees, or to certain tax-exempt organizations. Nonetheless, FECA did impose disclosure
requirements on many, but not all, contributions
and expenditures, and created the Federal Election
Commission to interpret and enforce this new law.
FECA was quickly challenged as unconstitutional
in the case Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The
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opponents of the law argued that FECA violated the
central purpose of the First Amendment: to secure the
widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources, and to ensure unfettered interchanges of ideas for bringing about political
and social changes desired by the people. They argued
that Congress was simply trying to restrict the speech
that had made itself the loudest in the marketplace,
and that the government may not restrict the speech
of some in our society solely in order to enhance the
voice of others. As the opponents of FECA saw the
issue, a political contribution affiliates a person with
a candidate, and it is by aggregating these individual
affiliations that the voices of like-minded people may
be amplified. They argued that this ability to express
and combine one’s support with others was not only
not a problem; it was a purposive goal of the speech
and associational rights.
In weighing these arguments, the Supreme Court
in Buckley asked this question: Did FECA safeguard the
integrity of the electoral process without directly and
substantially restricting political debate and discussion?
In a 294-page opinion, the Supreme Court said “yes”
and “no.” The Court upheld FECA’s disclosure requirements as inherently non-intrusive, and upheld FECA’s
contribution (as distinguished from expenditure) limitations as justified by the government’s interest in
preventing both the actual and perceived corruption
that can arise from elected officials’ indebtedness to
large donors. The Court agreed with Congress that, to
the extent that large contributions are given to secure
political quid pro quos from current and potential officeholders, the integrity of our system of representative
democracy is undermined. The Court found that such
contributions, by shaping public officers to the viewpoints of their benefactors, fettered speech even if it
increased its quantity. Given this compelling concern,
the Court viewed contribution limitations as imposing
“only a marginal restriction on the contributor’s ability
to engage in free communication.”
The Court, however, took a different view of
FECA’s expenditure limitations. There, the Court found
that restrictions on expenditures imposed “direct and
substantial” restraints on one’s ability to engage in
political debate. This was because the Court viewed
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the expenditure limitations as an attempt to equalize
the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections. Finding no persuasive
justification for such an attempt, the Court struck down
FECA’s expenditure limitations.
Finally, the Buckley Court upheld the ongoing
restrictions on the use of corporate or union treasury
funds to influence federal elections. But the Court
applied an important limitation: It said that the restriction
would apply, not to all election-related treasury expenditures, but only to those treasury expenditures that
“expressly advocated” for a candidate’s election or defeat.
Consequently, as long as an advertisement paid for by
corporate or union treasury funds did not use the “magic
words,” as they came to be known, to “vote for” or “vote
against” a candidate, the expenditure was lawful.
FROM BUCKLEY TO BCRA

s interpreted by these rulings in Buckley in 1976
and subsequent F.E.C. regulatory rulings, FECA
served as the legal cornerstone for campaign finance
law until 2002, when Congress enacted BCRA. It was
during that 26-year period that these two dominant
dynamics emerged: Mass media communications
became the essential medium of political campaigns,
and large sums of money were required to use that
medium successfully. This led candidates, parties and
other political players to seek aggressive ways around
FECA’s and Buckley’s limitations. The result of these
converging forces was an exponential spending increase
in both “soft money” and “issue ads.”
The term “soft money” is commonly used to define
those moneys that were not subject to FECA’s source
and amount contribution limitations and disclosure
requirements. In other words, as long as the money was
donated through, and spent by, national political parties
and their committees, state political parties and their
committees or certain tax exempt organizations, the
money was not limited or disclosed. In 1980, federal
soft money so routed totaled only $19 million. By
1992, it rose to $74 million. By 1996, soft money
reached $262 million and, by 2000, it had risen to
$487 million. Because of this trend, a Portland Press
Herald survey in 1996 revealed that 70% of respon-

A

dents believed that politicians listen to special interests
more than individual voters.
Similarly, “issue ads” are those advertisements typically run by a union or for-profit or non-profit corporation that identify a federal candidate but do not use
the so-called “magic words”—prohibited by FECA
and Buckley—of “expressly advocating” for the election
or defeat of that candidate. Instead, the ads simply
identify a candidate and then make clear the sponsors’
views of the candidacy. According to BCRA’s
supporters, such ads were thinly disguised “express
advocacy” designed to benefit wealthy corporations
and labor unions. They pointed to studies that found
that 99% of these ads refer to a candidate by name;
95% run in the last two months of an election; and
that 94% were viewed as clear attempts to influence the
outcome of an election. However, only 4% of these
ads actually used the “magic words” that would have
rendered them illegal. Spending on such ads increased
from $150 million in 1996 to $340 million in 1998,
and then to a remarkable $500 million by 2000.
By 1996, prominent members of Congress on both
sides of the aisle believed that the exponential growth in
soft money and issue ads was, at best, a primary source
of voter cynicism and apathy, and, at worst, the reason
for the perception that elected officials were corrupted
by special interests. Congress thus began in earnest to
amend FECA in two key ways. First, Congress sought to
regulate the flow of soft money by imposing limitations
and disclosure requirements on previously exempted
national and state political parties and their committees,
as well as certain tax exempt organizations. Arizona
Senator John McCain and Wisconsin Senator Russell
Feingold were the primary champions of these provisions, hence the common moniker “McCain-Feingold.”
Second, Congress would regulate what many came to
call “sham issue ads,” but what BCRA would call “electioneering communications.” To ensure that this provision
was “narrowly tailored” if tested for constitutionality, the
regulations applied only to ads run on television that
refer to a candidate; are aired within 60 days of a general
election; 30 days of a primary election; paid for by a
corporation or labor union; and are shown in a region
of at least 50,000 constituents. Senator Snowe was a
primary architect and proponent of this new regulation.
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FROM BCRA TO THE SUPREME COURT

t took six years, but Congress finally passed BCRA
by close votes in each house in March of 2002. One
day after President Bush signed BCRA into law, the
first of over 90 plaintiffs filed the first of 12 lawsuits
challenging the law’s constitutionality. The plaintiffs
spanned the spectrum of conservative and liberal
interests. They included the Republican National
Committee, Democratic state parties and a Libertarian
state party. They also included a slew of uncommon
political bedfellows: the National Rifle Association
(NRA), U.S. Chamber of Commerce, AFL-CIO,
National Association of Broadcasters, American Civil
Liberties Union and National Right to Life Committee.
Although the NRA was prepared to lead the litigation,
it allowed Kentucky Senator Mitch McConnell to file
his challenge first so that the case would carry his name,
“McConnell v. F.E.C.” Knowing this, one cannot help but
note the irony that the “McConnell” decision will forever
stand in favor of the law that the senator from
Kentucky so fiercely opposed.
On the other side, United States Senators McCain,
Feingold and Snowe all intervened to help with the
defense. They did so because the number and wealth
of the plaintiffs suggested that additional political and
legal resources would be helpful. Between May and
December of 2002, the plaintiffs and defendants
compiled and debated approximately 200,000 pages
of documents regarding the predominant election practices and abuses that BCRA was enacted to address.
In December of 2002, a special three-judge trial court
held a two-day trial and, in May of 2003, issued a 2-1
decision striking down the heart of the soft money
and issue ad provisions. The judges issued four opinions
exceeding 1,600 pages, and they essentially held that
the key pieces of both provisions intruded too deeply
on individual speech and associational rights (McConnell
v. F.E.C , 251 F.Supp. 2d 176 and 948 [D.D.C. 2003]).
Over 70 of the plaintiffs and all of the defendants
then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The defendants wanted to resuscitate BCRA and the plaintiffs
wanted to finish it off. The plaintiffs’ primary claims
were that BCRA violated the right of free speech
under the First Amendment by unduly burdening the

I
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ability of various participants in the political process
to express their views, and their right of association
by unduly burdening their ability to coordinate such
expression. They also argued that BCRA violated
due process under the Fifth Amendment by being too
vague, overbroad and, somewhat hypocritically, underinclusive. Finally, the Plaintiffs argued that BCRA
violated equal protection under the Fifth Amendment
by treating dissimilarly those who are similarly situated,
and the rights of states under the Tenth Amendment
to legislate exclusively over certain state-related aspects
of federal campaign activities.
Because, technically, there were 12 different appeals
with over a dozen primary legal challenges and eight
different constitutional arguments, briefs surpassed
1,000 pages. Given the importance and complexity of
the case, and because presidential primaries were not
far off, the Supreme Court held a special session in
September of 2003, just to hear this case. The Court
allowed a highly unusual four-hour argument by seven
different lawyers. Typically, the Court only meets in its
regularly scheduled sessions and hears 30 minutes of
argument from one attorney on each side of the case.
In an unprecedented event, three solicitor generals (one
current and two former) were among the lawyers who
argued orally to the Court.
THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION

n December 10, 2003, the Supreme Court, by
a 5-4 vote, largely reversed the trial court and
upheld BCRA’s essential provisions in the 300-page
decision, McConnell v. F.E.C., 540 U.S. (2003). The
majority opinion was written by moderate Justices John
Paul Stevens and Sandra Day O’Connor, and joined
by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsberg, David Souter and
Stephen Breyer. Their opinion stands on five pillars.
First, the majority was willing to defer institutionally to Congress. There, the Court expressly noted that
“the respect that the legislative and judicial branches
owe to one another” was a “powerful” factor in its decision. Second, the majority was willing to show subject
matter deference to Congress’ factual findings about
modern campaign practices and Congress’ policy judgment about the ill-effects of those practices:

O
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Many years ago we observed that to say that
Congress is without power to pass appropriate
legislation to safeguard… an election from
the improper use of money to influence the
result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self protection. We abide
by that conviction in considering Congress’
most recent effort to confine the ill-effects of
aggregated wealth on our political system….

A very interesting twist underlying this ruling on
the issue ads was that Justice O’Connor and Chief
Justice Rhenquist voted on opposite sides. They also
had voted on opposite sides of a very similar state
law in the 1990 case, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). However, in McConnell,
both Justices changed the views that they expressed in
Austin. In McConnell, the Justices were still on
opposing sides, so their respective shifts cancelled
each other out.

Third, the majority was persuaded that soft money
restrictions were justified and reasonable:
Just as troubling to a functioning democracy
as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger
that officeholders will decide issues not on
their merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those
who have made large financial contributions
valued by the officeholder. Even if it occurs
only occasionally, the potential for such undue
influence is manifest. And unlike straight
cash-for-votes transactions, such corruption is
neither easily detected nor practical to criminalize. The best means of prevention is to
identify and to remove the temptation.
Fourth, the majority upheld the issue ad regulations by relaxing the “magic words” standard that it
had set in Buckley. The plaintiffs in McConnell had
argued that the “electioneering communications” regulation was overbroad because it failed to respect the
Buckley safe harbor for ads that were not “express
advocacy.” Defendants conceded that fact, but argued
that the Buckley standard was not binding and, more
importantly, no longer legitimate. To the surprise of
many, the Court sided with the defendants when it
wrote that “Buckley’s express advocacy line, in short,
has not aided the legislative effort to combat real or
apparent corruption, and Congress enacted the BCRA
to correct the flaws it found in the existing system.”
This opened the door to the majority upholding the
provision, which it did after recognizing that the provision did not ban a corporation or union from speaking
through an ad; it only required that such speech be
paid for out of non-treasury funds.

…the majority was persuaded that soft money
restrictions were justifiable and reasonable.
Finally, the majority was unmoved by plaintiffs
repeated claim that BCRA violated due process because
it purported to address some, but not all, campaign
finance problems:
We are under no illusion that BCRA will be
the last congressional statement on the matter.
Money, like water, will always find an outlet.
What problems will arise, and how Congress
will respond, are concerns for another day.
Voting against all of these findings by the majority
were the four conservative Justices of the Court.
These dissenting justices, led by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, viewed the essential issues in very different
terms. On the issue of deference, the dissent wrote
that “[n]o doubt Congress was convinced by the many
abuses of the current system that something in this area
must be done. Its response, however, was too blunt.”
On the core issues of speech, the dissent wrote that:
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The First Amendment underwrites the
freedom to experiment and to create in the
realm of thought and speech. Citizens must
be free to use new forms, and new forums, for
the expression of ideas. The civic discourse
belongs to the people and Government may
not prescribe the means used to conduct it….
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Impact of McConnell on Maine’s Politics

Finally, the dissent was particularly critical of the
issue ad provision:
Here in Maine, we can expect several important effects on our
own electoral and political processes. Most importantly, McConnell
should fulfill BCRA’s essential goal: to enhance the people’s confidence in both the process and outcome of their federal government. The disclosure provisions will act to better inform Maine
voters before an election, and enhance their ability to hold federal
officials more accountable thereafter. Likewise, the new contribution limitations will reduce candidates’ incentive to be unduly
responsive to certain donors.
Another, perhaps more visible impact will be a dramatic reduction
in the number “issue ads” we see on television. We also should see
an increased role for political action committees as the agents and
accountants for political activity, as well as a move by the political
parties to more grass roots efforts. Both of these effects, again, are
likely to flow from the changes in soft money regulations.
However, it is not anticipated that the overall amounts of money
in Maine’s federal political campaigns will decline. Their rate of
increase may slow a little, but otherwise the key change will be in
knowing the source and recipients of the monies, whatever their
amounts.
Finally, McConnell and BCRA may serve as templates for amending
laws that regulate state races. This will certainly be true in larger
states, where much larger amounts of money are spent in elections
for state offices, but the escalation of fund-raising activity in
Maine’s gubernatorial races may be sufficient to attract BCRA-type
regulation of races for the Blaine House.

Likewise, the dissent found no meaningful
evidence of “corruption,” whether real or perceived:
[A] close association with others, especially in
the realm of political speech, is not a surrogate for corruption; it is one of our most treasured First Amendment rights. The court’s
willingness to impute corruption on the basis
of a relationship greatly infringes associational rights and expands Congress’ ability to
regulate political speech….
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The chilling endpoint of the Court’s
reasoning is not difficult to foresee: outright
regulation of the press…. What is to stop a
future Congress from determining that the
press is ‘too influential,’ and that the ‘appearance of corruption’ is significant when the
media organizations endorse candidates or run
‘slanted’ or ‘biased’ news stories in favor of
candidates or parties?
Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas,
and Antonin Scalia joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in
the dissent. Despite their concerns, BCRA, with both
its soft money and issue ad provisions in tact, was
upheld 5-4.
CONCLUSION: A WORD ABOUT
HOW WE JUDGE ACCESS TO
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

ongress sought with BCRA to enhance the
people’s confidence in both the process and
outcome of their government. Yet despite these
uncontestable merits, it remains remarkable that BCRA
became law, particularly because BCRA had to overcome widespread and well-funded opposition of
uncommon political allies, years of legislative defeat,
and the contrary self-interests of many incumbents.
That BCRA overcame all of these challenges is
compelling testament to the power of the represented
to demand meaningful change. Indeed, the very essence
of our representative government is that the people,
by their millions, delegate to just 535 members of
Congress and the president the power to decide the
rules by which we all live. In making this delegation,
the people vote their trust and trust their vote until
the next election. However, public cynicism about the
meaningfulness of individual votes and the legitimacy
of decisionmaking given the proliferation of unlimited
and unreported donations challenged this very trust.
BCRA prevailed upon Congress and the president
solely because this majoritarian challenge was simply
too stern. But where, in the end, did this act of the

C
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majority finally get decided? In the courts and, therefore
ironically enough, in the decidedly anti-majoritarian
process of judicial review. Indeed, in order to stop
BCRA, the plaintiffs needed only to persuade five
judges, elected by no one, to defeat the clear will of the
people and their hard-fought representative majority.
This profound paradox necessarily returns us to the
central and stabilizing decision that our Constitution
has made for us. This is the decision—not of what
gets decided, but of who gets to decide—for in the
Constitution we have consciously committed ourselves
to require appointed judges, and not elected politicians,
to have final decisionmaking authority over how we
govern ourselves.
As Professor Tribe insightfully observed many
years ago, the Constitution memorializes our “deepest
beliefs” and commands our “enduring adherence”
to those beliefs in a “setting carefully insulated from
6
momentary pressures.” This command takes final
decisionmaking authority away from elected politicians
who may be enticed to decide in simple favor of
retaining their own power and, in their place, stands
the Justices of the Supreme Court. The consequence is
that the debate is not one of masked political expediency, but one of “shared language of constitutional
rights and responsibilities.” Such debates do not—and
are not intended—to yield “one permanent reconciliation of conflicting impulses.” Instead, they are intended
to be a part of a “judicially modulated unending
struggle” that recognizes that historical principles will
always be challenged by the changing realities of our
evolving national life. It also recognizes that the very
process of engaging in a judicial, and not a political,
debate creates a bulwark of legitimacy for the immediate decision at hand, as well as the more important
possibility that the nation may find in its commitment
to such discipline both an institutional stability and a
meaningful sense of national morality. 
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